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Abstract:  
This paper has two objectives: to critique the dominant opportunity discovery and creation 
literatures, and; to propose a new, critical realist-inspired analytical framework to theorise 
the causes, processes and consequences of entrepreneurial action – one that needs no 
concept of opportunity. We offer three reasons to support our critique of opportunity 
studies. First, there are important absences, contradictions and inconsistencies in definitions 
of opportunity in theoretical and empirical work that mean the term cannot signal a clear 
direction for theorising or empirical research.  Our central criticism is that the concept of 
opportunity cannot refer simultaneously, without contradiction, to a social context offering 
profit-making prospects, to particular practices, and to agents’ subjective beliefs or 
imagined futures. Second, a new definition of opportunity would perpetuate the conceptual 
chaos. Third, useful concepts to capture important entrepreneurial processes are readily 
available, for instance, combining resources, creating new ventures and achieving product 
sales, which render a concept of opportunity superfluous. Instead, we conceptualise 
entrepreneurial action as investments in resources intended to create new goods and 
services for market exchange emergent from the interaction between agential, social-
structural and cultural causal powers.   
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INTRODUCTION  
“Our field is fundamentally concerned with understanding how, in the absence 
of current markets for future goods and services, these goods and services 
manage to come into existence. Thus entrepreneurship as a scholarly field seeks 
to understand how opportunities to bring into existence ‘future’ goods and 
services are discovered, created, and exploited, by whom, and with what 
consequences.” (Venkataraman 1997:120, italics in original) 
 
Since these words were written, opportunity has perhaps become the central organising 
concept in the study of entrepreneurship (Busenitz et al. 2014).  What is striking re-reading 
Venkataraman, widely cited as a landmark publication redirecting research attention 
towards opportunities, is how influential the second sentence has been, yet the first 
sentence defines the entrepreneurship field without a concept of opportunity. We agree 
with Davidsson (2015) that the phenomena discussed under the label of ‘entrepreneurial 
opportunities’ are important but we are sceptical that the concept of opportunity helps to 
explain adequately the causes, processes and consequences of entrepreneurial action. This 
paper therefore has two objectives: first, to challenge the consensus (Zahra and Wright 
2011) surrounding the value of the concept of opportunity evident in the entrepreneurship 
literature by critiquing the dominant discovery and creation approaches; and, second, to 
outline a critical realist-informed approach to the study of entrepreneurial action that needs 
no concept of opportunity.   
 
Powerful theory in entrepreneurship, as in the social sciences more generally (Sayer 1992), 
requires precisely defined concepts (Bygrave and Hofer 1991). The fundamental question is 
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whether social scientists define and deploy the concept of opportunity in cogent and 
consistent ways that enable robust explanations of important entrepreneurial processes.  
We therefore depart from the view of Crawford et al. (2016) that ‘what is an opportunity?’ 
is the wrong question. For those who believe opportunity is an important concept, it is vital 
it is defined coherently if it is to contribute to knowledge.   
 
Our principal concern is not to advance a new theory of opportunity but to question 
whether we should conceptualise entrepreneurial action within an opportunity framework 
at all. We offer three sets of reasons to support our argument: one, the absences, 
contradictions and inconsistencies in definitions of opportunity in theoretical and empirical 
work; two, the risk that proposing a new definition of opportunity would perpetuate the 
conceptual chaos; and, three, the ready availability of useful concepts to capture important 
entrepreneurial processes such as imagining a business idea, acquiring, combining and 
mobilising resources, networking with stakeholders, creating a new venture and achieving a 
product sale – all of which render a concept of opportunity superfluous. We propose to 
replace  opportunity with a new analytical framework, one intended to theorise 
entrepreneurial action, defined as investments in resources intended to produce goods and 
services for market exchange, in terms of the interaction of agential, social-structural and 
cultural causal powers.  These resource investments we describe as entrepreneurial 
projects. 
 
The popularity of the opportunity concept means it has become a convenient hook upon 
which to hang an analysis but because its referents are highly elastic, its contribution to 
understanding entrepreneurial processes is profoundly ambiguous.  Users of the concept 
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often switch, without acknowledgment, between radically different meanings of 
opportunity in their theoretical and empirical work: as social situations possessing profit-
making potential; as specific activities, including making sales; and as agential beliefs or 
imagined futures. This easy elision of different definitions constitutes a major impediment 
to explanation of entrepreneurial processes.  As studies take different referents for the 
concept of opportunity, or none at all, the term does not signal a clear direction for 
theorising or empirical research (Görling and Rehn 2008; Hansen et al. 2011; Arend 2014). 
Davidsson (2015) found that 80 per cent of 210 studies reviewed provided no definition, 
while others offered multiple definitions within a single work.  We accept that conceptual 
ambiguity might stimulate advances in an emerging field by encouraging multiple lines of 
theorising and research but, over time, a lack of conceptual clarity becomes a major 
obstacle to theory development.  The opportunity concept has arguably become an empty 
signifier, a catch-all construct used to refer to any aspect of entrepreneurial thought, action 
or environment deemed interesting.  Opportunity studies simply do not cumulate to 
provide, or support, a progressively developing theorisation of entrepreneurial action.    
 
This conceptual confusion is an emergent property of the field. It is not the fault of any 
single author, or group of authors, although we do believe that advocates of opportunity 
creation, whom we discuss later, might have served the field better by introducing a 
new/different conceptual vocabulary to specify their particular objects of interest rather 
than referring to them as opportunities.   
 
Several alternative ways of dealing with the morass of opportunity definitions are possible. 
First, we could live with multiple meanings and request that researchers make clear their 
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position before presenting findings. Davidsson (2015) suggests most do not do this; rather, 
many cite previous work as authority for their own approach. But even if researchers set out 
their definitions as requested, this only institutionalises the current conceptual quagmire. 
Second, we might retain one definition of opportunity and drop the others. Unfortunately, 
the available definitions, taken singly, are used in inconsistent ways; collectively, they have 
produced a muddle. Nor, we feel, can the problem be remedied by redefinition. Indeed, our 
initial aim was to propose a new definition, intended to synthesise and supersede earlier 
ones, but, for reasons we hope to make clear, we decided this would not be possible.  
 
Third, we might take a different path, one that avoids the term opportunity. It is because 
the term opportunity has become invested with conflicting meanings and, less visibly, 
incorporated contradictory ontological commitments that we decided to write this paper.  
We conclude that the concept of opportunity should be dropped from the entrepreneurship 
lexicon - a view shared or implied by others (Gartner 2003; Davidsson 2015). We recognise 
others might not wish to discard the term altogether, even if persuaded of our arguments, 
because our proposition is radical.  Our work should therefore be seen as a contribution to 
the conversation about the value of the opportunity concept and as an argument for a 
different approach. 
 
Drawing on critical realist philosophy of science (Bhaskar 1978, 1979; Collier 1994; Sayer 
2000), our second, more positive, aim is to propose a new non-opportunity-based 
framework for studying entrepreneurial action. We conceptualise entrepreneurial action as 
a socio-historical process of creating new goods and services for market exchange emergent 
from the interaction between entrepreneurs and their structural and cultural contexts. The 
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term ‘new’ connotes no profound novelty; it encompasses goods and services imitating 
those already in existence. We disagree with those who claim critical realism necessarily 
entails a commitment to the discovery approach (Alvarez and Barney 2010) while agreeing 
with others that action - not opportunity - should be the focus of attention (Foss and Klein 
2012; Spedale and Watson 2014), although we stress that all action needs to be explained in 
relation to a wider structural and cultural context.  There are no context-free actions (Archer 
1995).  In line with calls to pay greater attention to context (Zahra et al. 2014), our approach 
aims to facilitate more fruitful theorising, particularly of the multi-stranded influence of 
context on entrepreneurial action, than a framework founded on the slippery notion of 
opportunity. 
 
We believe that failure to engage in ontological theorising has been an unrecognised source 
of problems in using the concept of opportunity, enabling researchers to move between a 
melange of meanings without fully considering the implications for their analyses. Recent 
attempts to revitalise the concept of opportunity, drawing on similar critical realist ideas to 
those elaborated here (Martin and Wilson 2014; Ramoglou and Tsang 2015; Wilson and 
Martin 2015), generate genuine insights - but by adding another layer of meaning to the 
term, paradoxically, threaten to amplify the confusion we seek to combat. No argument can 
conclusively settle the debate about the value of the opportunity concept but it is legitimate 
to ask whether the entrepreneurship field is progressing or degenerating with contradictory 
conceptions of opportunity in play. We do, however, welcome these efforts to engage 
explicitly with ontology and, more specifically, for developing critical realist-inspired 
analyses.  This paper seeks to complement these works while decoupling critical realist 
analysis from the concept of opportunity. 
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The next section sets out the key features of critical realist social ontology and argues its 
relevance for theorising entrepreneurial action.  We then critique the dominant discovery 
and creation conceptions of opportunity, and attempts to synthesise the two, from a critical 
realist standpoint.  Finally, we set out an alternative approach for the study of 
entrepreneurial action and illustrate the possibilities with examples from the literature that 
come closest to the type of approach we propose.  
  
USING CRITICAL REALISM TO STUDY ENTREPRENEURIAL ACTION  
Social science research is necessarily informed by metatheoretical assumptions regarding the 
nature of the human-made world (ontology) (Bhaskar 1979). Contrary to Dimov (2007), one 
cannot be silent on ontology. Ontological commitments are non-optional (Fleetwood 2005); 
failure to be explicit about them only leads to their unacknowledged reintroduction into 
analysis and explanation. Such assumptions necessarily influence research practice, shaping 
conceptions of the social objects1 studied and the methods used to study them. Critical realism 
sets out particular ontological commitments (Bhaskar 1979; Lawson 1997; Sayer 2000; Groff 
2004; Elder-Vass 2010), licensing a range of theories that are consistent with them, while 
ruling out those that are inconsistent as either false or incomplete (Bhaskar 1978). There is 
no single critical realist theory of entrepreneurial action - or of anything else. Critical realism 
                                                          
1 The concept ‘social object’ refers to any human-made, socially real entity (Fleetwood 
2005) that is the product of human interaction that researchers conceptualise and study in 
their theoretical and empirical work. Examples include organisations, markets and cultures. 
This definition excludes materially real artefacts such as cars, computers and chairs. Social 
objects may, but need not, reflect purposeful design. The concept does not imply social 
objects exist fully autonomously from the people whose activities produce them, that such 
objects possess invariant properties through time or that these objects determine how 
agents act.  
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cannot adjudicate between rival theories that are consistent with its ontological 
assumptions; these are substantive matters for researchers in the respective fields to 
debate. 
 
Here we outline three important critical realist ideas to critique the dominant conceptions 
of opportunity. From the early work of Bhaskar (1978, 1979), we draw two key concepts: 
ontological intransitivity and the stratification of social reality. From Archer (1995) we 
introduce analytical dualism, a method that can provide powerful conceptual tools to 
theorise the causes, processes and consequences of entrepreneurial action.   
 
First, realist social science presupposes that social objects are intransitive: that is, they exist 
and act independently of the researcher’s identification, or conceptual, linguistic or 
discursive constructions, of them (Bhaskar 1978; Collier 1994).  Without a commitment to 
realism, knowledge claims cannot be made at all because there are no independently 
existing and acting objects to know (Searle 2010).  The real is whatever exists, whether 
mountains, rivers or human beings, their activities, institutions and experiences, including 
the generative causal powers that produce these entities (Sayer 2000).  Social objects, like 
natural ones, are objective in that they exist independently of whether the researcher 
observes them or not (Bhaskar 1979; Fleetwood 2005). It is a common misconception that 
realism and constructionism are necessarily opposed. Critical realists can accept fully that 
the social world is made by people’s activities, they just hold back from claiming that the 
reality of social processes is exhausted by agents’ culturally-shaped descriptions (or 
constructions) of them (Elder-Vass 2012; Ramoglou and Tsang 2015).  Even radical Austrian 
subjectivists who emphasise the crucial role of imagined futures as influences on 
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entrepreneurial action (Chiles et al. 2010), presuppose the existence of a specific class of 
agents (entrepreneurs) with particular powers (the capacity to exercise imagination and 
choice), as well as particular non-agential, social objects (markets) that arise from 
entrepreneurial activities. To conceptualise opportunities, and to claim to study them, 
therefore, is to presuppose their independent existence.  
 
Social objects are concept-dependent, that is, their existence necessarily depends on human 
agents possessing some conception of what they are doing when they act in ways that 
contribute to the production of such objects, whether intentionally or inadvertently 
(Bhaskar 1979; Sayer 1992). For instance, new ventures exist because the agents involved 
(entrepreneur, investors, employees, customers) act – not just talk - in particular ways. But, 
this does not mean discursive constructions of activities and their effects are exhaustive of 
social reality (Fleetwood 2005).  Agents involved in the production of social objects do not 
possess full awareness of the consequences of their actions.  Entrepreneurs forming new 
ventures contribute to the transformation of a market economy whether or not they intend 
or understand this. Venture creation is likely to generate responses from stakeholders which 
might or might not be perceived by the entrepreneur.  Social objects such as organisations 
and markets are capable of generating effects independently of the way both the agents 
studied and the researchers studying them construct them in thought or discourse (Groff 
2008). 
 
Second, critical realists argue that the social world is stratified, comprising distinct, though 
related, domains (Bhaskar 1978, 1979): the empirical (experiences, beliefs, imagined 
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futures); the actual (actions, events); and the real or deep2 (the generative causal powers 
that produce actions or events).3  The real/deep level encompasses actual and empirical 
levels, and the actual incorporates the empirical. The social world is an open, structured, 
unfolding process, in which actions and events are caused by multiple, interacting powers 
(Bhaskar 1979). Because of this openness, the operation of powers (at the deep level) 
contributes to the production of a wide range of actions and events (at the actual level) that 
may or may not be observed (at the empirical level). The activation of particular causal 
powers does not necessarily lead to event regularities or to events that are observed. 
Theorising causal powers and their effects in terms of observable manifestations is to 
reduce the ‘deep’ ontology of critical realism to a ‘flat’ ontology of experience.  So, how do 
proponents of the opportunity concept conceptualise opportunities – as agential beliefs, as 
actions or events, or as generative causal powers?  It is vital that researchers propose 
coherent conceptions of opportunity and apply them consistently.  
 
Third, Archer’s (1995) analytical dualism provides a framework connecting the deep social 
ontology of critical realism with theory seeking to explain how social objects are produced, 
intentionally or inadvertently, by particular agents in particular contexts (Bhaskar 1979). The 
existence and activity of social objects are both agent- and context-dependent; explanations 
of entrepreneurial action therefore require reference to both. The social context might be 
                                                          
2 Fleetwood (2005), following Lawson (1995), prefers the term ‘deep’ to Bhaskar’s (1978) 
designation of the ‘real’ level to avoid confusion; all three levels are real. 
3 Scientists identify the causal powers of objects in laboratory experiments by eliminating 
the effects of others (Bhaskar 1978). Outside the laboratory, objects continue to act 
according to their powers, though their effects vary because the world is an open system, 
with multiple interacting powers contributing to the production of events. This ontological 
distinction between causal powers and events is fundamental to critical realism.  
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separated into structure and culture.4 Entrepreneurs are variably positioned in relation to 
relatively enduring social structures and cultures (Bhaskar 1979; Archer 1988). Structures 
such as organisations and markets are constituted by relationships between internally-
related positions,5 possessing the power to influence the exercise of agency by those 
occupying particular positions. For example, markets are structures that affect the activities 
of the buyers and sellers whose relations constitute them, rendering particular actions 
possible or impossible, easy or difficult, rewarding or costly. This structural conception of 
context can be contrasted with individualist, voluntarist accounts that treat agential 
interaction as purely contingent, implicitly assuming that individuals might meet and form 
relationships with any other (Archer 2014). A structural conception of relationships 
facilitates robust explanations of entrepreneurial action that avoid the twin problems of 
determinism (where events are explained solely in terms of the operation of structural 
forces, ignoring agent choice) and of voluntarism (where events are explained solely in 
terms of agent motivations without acknowledgement of the structural and cultural 
conditions that make them possible).  
 
Structures and cultures impact agents by shaping the situations they confront, which 
facilitate or frustrate the conception and attainment of particular projects (Archer 1995). 
Layder (2006) distinguishes three types of context in terms of agents’ capacities to 
                                                          
4 Structure and culture are separated to make clear that both social roles and relationships 
and ideas, meanings, norms and discourses are non-agential, socially real, causally 
efficacious entities possessing powers to influence the exercise of agency (Elder-Vass 2012). 
Agents may be able to give discursive accounts of their motivations but may be less 
conscious of the embeddedness of those motives in a deeper cultural context (Porpora 
2015). 
5 Positions are internally related when their existence and causal powers necessarily depend 
on relations with others. Examples include employer and employee, and buyer and seller. 
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transform them – these are situated activity, the arena of personal interaction; social 
settings, the reproduced social relations, positions and practices that constitute the broader 
context of situated activity; and the distribution of material and cultural resources across 
major social groups (such as class, gender and ethnicity) that influence the reproduction of 
social relations, positions and practices.  The arena of personal interaction is more 
amenable to transformation by individual agents than are social settings which, in turn, are 
more pliable than the domain of material and cultural resources.   
 
Archer (1995, 2014) elaborates the process of interaction between structure, culture and 
agency through time in the form of a 3-part morphogenetic cycle of structural and cultural 
conditioning, social interaction, and structural and cultural elaboration. This is an analytical 
model; in practice, conditioning, interaction and elaboration occur continuously in relation 
to the multiple structures and cultures within which agents act.  Several points about 
structure and culture require emphasis. First, structures and cultures are necessary 
conditions for any intentional social act. The exercise of agency presupposes some context, 
for example, purchasing raw materials presupposes the existence of factor markets.  Agents 
necessarily seek to realise their projects in structural and cultural circumstances largely not 
of their own making.  Second, structures and cultures possess causal powers irreducible to 
those of the agents whose relations constitute them.  Markets, for instance, might be 
distinguished in terms of the nature and level of competition.  These structural properties of 
markets exist only because of agents’ activities, and influence what agents are able to do – 
but are not themselves properties of agents.  
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Third, structures and cultures only generate effects through the exercise of agency, by 
conditioning (enabling, motivating and constraining) – but not determining – the activities of 
particular agents pursuing particular projects.  Structural and cultural positioning enables 
particular agents to act in particular ways, both reflexively and habitually or unself-
consciously (Fleetwood 2008; Sayer 2009; Akram 2013), whether or not agents are aware of 
such enablements.  Agents are able, to variable degrees, to reflect on their circumstances, 
dedicate themselves to particular projects which they subjectively value (such as starting a 
new venture), and choose to act in ways they believe, fallibly, will realise those projects 
(Archer 2000, 2003). Agents always possess a degree of discretion to act otherwise, even if 
this might incur high personal costs, because  behaviour is shaped partly by the 
contradictory pressures imparted by particular structures (Luke and Bates 2015) and 
cultures, and partly by agents’ simultaneous positioning within multiple structures and 
cultures, each offering a different profile of enablements, incentives and constraints 
(Martinez Dy et al. 2014).  
 
Fourth, conditioned agential interaction, in turn, generates structural and cultural 
elaboration.  Structures and cultures are reproduced or transformed over time by agents’ 
activities, intentionally and inadvertently. Transformation gives rise to emergent structural 
and cultural causal powers that influence the exercise of future agency. Markets, for 
instance, may become more, or less, competitive over time as a consequence of 
buyer/seller interaction, with consequences for the future action of all. The dynamic 
openness of society permits novel forms of conditioned activity; agents can act creatively 
but not just as they please.   
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We emphasise the purpose of critical realist-informed analysis is explanation - not 
prediction (Bhaskar 1978).  Explanation requires the development of concepts that abstract 
from the particularities of actual, concrete cases to capture the necessary properties and 
powers that make social objects what they are, and to distinguish these from purely 
contingent features (Sayer 1992). Formal organisations, as a particular kind of entity, for 
instance, can be conceptualised abstractly as social entities with designated roles defined in 
terms of specific rights and obligations, and relations between these roles, despite 
contingent differences such as the particular people who currently occupy these roles. The 
study of any actual, concrete organisation must take into account the multiplicity of 
necessary and contingent influences on organisational practices and their consequences, 
including agents’ beliefs about, and intentions towards, their roles and relationships. But 
these agential properties and powers should not form part of the abstract definition of 
formal organisation. 
 
The openness of the social world and the emergence of novel structural, cultural and 
agential powers over time mean that there is an important asymmetry between explanation 
and prediction (Sayer 1992). Although retrospectively we can often give well-grounded 
explanations of past events, prospectively we are very rarely, if ever, able to do so because 
we do not know which of the myriad of possible sets of circumstances, intrinsic as well as 
extrinsic to the agent, will actually materialise (Bhaskar 1986).  
 
We now turn to examine the major approaches to the conception and study of opportunity - 
discovery and creation - using the lens of a critical realist commitment to an intransitive, 
structured, open, transformable and emergent social world. We seek to show how the 
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major approaches either do not deal explicitly with the issue of social ontology, while 
implicitly drawing on similar ideas to critical realism (discovery), or make unwarranted links 
between ontology and the particular positions adopted or rejected (creation). Both cause 
serious problems for users of the opportunity concept.  
 
OPPORTUNITY DISCOVERY 
Advocates of the discovery approach conceptualise opportunities as social situations with 
particular properties existing independently of any observer. Kirzner (1973) is often 
considered the progenitor of this approach with his description of opportunities as hitherto 
unnoticed possibilities for profit.  In later work, Kirzner (2009) clarified that discovery is a 
metaphor intended to describe the function entrepreneurs perform in moving an economy 
from disequilibrium to equilibrium, rather than a description of what entrepreneurs 
subjectively perceive themselves to be doing.  Klein (2008) suggests those who followed 
Kirzner misused his work by transposing his macro-level metaphor of opportunity into a 
micro-level concept referring to the context within which individual entrepreneurs act.  
 
The discovery approach is best exemplified by Shane’s (2003) individual-opportunity nexus, 
which links enterprising individuals to independently existing lucrative opportunities (see 
also Shane 2000, 2012; Shane and Venkataraman 2000; Eckhardt and Shane 2003, 2010). In 
what follows we distinguish a primary and an unintended secondary view for Shane.  In the 
primary view, the one most cited in the literature, independently existing opportunities are 
argued to arise from technological, political/regulatory and social/demographic changes 
that create market imperfections. Opportunity discovery and exploitation are conceived as 
distinct moments in an historical process: discovery necessarily pre-dates exploitation. The 
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‘favorability’ of an opportunity as a desired, successful outcome for the entrepreneur is 
presupposed in discovery accounts (Davidsson 2015).  As effects are only discoverable 
subsequent to action, the term opportunity can only be justified retrospectively (Gartner et 
al. 2003; Dimov 2011). Using the term opportunity prospectively in discovery accounts is 
illegitimate because the (successful) effects of action cannot be known at that time.6 
 
On closer examination, however, we find that Shane (2003) also works with a secondary 
view, a different conception of opportunity: as a situation in which entrepreneurs believe 
profit-making prospects exist. This approach is confirmed by his acceptance that 
opportunities need not be successful (Shane 2003:9).  The switch to opportunity as belief 
may appear innocuous but this makes the existence of an opportunity observer-dependent 
and observer-relative because it acknowledges perceptions of profit-making possibilities are 
fallible. Shane’s observer-dependent definitions of opportunity are presented below.  
 
 “I define an entrepreneurial opportunity as a situation in which a person can 
create a new means-ends framework for recombining resources that the 
entrepreneur believes will yield a profit” (Shane 2003:18, italics in original).  
 
“entrepreneurship requires the existence of opportunities, or situations in which 
people believe that they can use new means-ends frameworks to recombine 
resources to generate profit” (Shane 2003:6, italics added).  
 
                                                          
6 Prospective use of the term might be defended on the grounds that an opportunity exists 
but has not been exploited (successfully) yet. Such claims can never be refuted. There is 
always tomorrow.  
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From a critical realist standpoint, Shane operates with contradictory conceptions of 
opportunity because he conflates circumstances with agential beliefs about those 
circumstances.  These are not two ways of saying the same thing; ontologically, structural 
and cultural circumstances and agential beliefs are very different entities.  In his secondary 
view, Shane treats the individual’s beliefs as necessary for the existence of an opportunity: if 
no individual believes a profit can be made, then there is no opportunity.  Yet this 
contradicts Shane’s primary argument that opportunities exist independently of the 
observer.  The individual-opportunity nexus would be unintelligible if the ontological 
separation between individual and opportunity was not intended because if the existence of 
the opportunity is dependent on the individual’s beliefs then the individual would be on 
both sides of the nexus. Shane’s secondary view collapses opportunity as a feature of the 
external environment into the entrepreneur’s beliefs about it. Conflating structure and 
agency prohibits them being prised apart to investigate their causal interplay (Archer 1995). 
 
Using a single concept, opportunity, to refer to circumstances and agential beliefs plagues 
the discovery literature.  In framing their theoretical and empirical work, researchers citing 
Shane as authority for the approach they take often switch between his primary and 
secondary definitions of opportunity, usually without acknowledgement. Conceptual 
slippage is evident in shifts between what are referred to as objective opportunities, on the 
one hand, and potential or perceived opportunities on the other (van Burg and Romme 
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2014). By using terms such as search, discovery, identification and recognition, the 
independent existence of opportunities is assumed (Gartner et al. 2003).7    
 
We illustrate the problem of switching definitions with a few examples; the literature offers 
many more. Casson and Wadeson (2007) conceive of opportunities as potentially profitable 
but hitherto unexploited projects.  But if opportunities can only be identified 
retrospectively, how can we know in advance that a hitherto unexploited project will be 
profitable and therefore meet the definition of an opportunity? Baron (2006) defines an 
opportunity as a perceived means of generating economic value that previously has not 
been exploited and is not currently being exploited by others. But, if no-one perceives a 
means of generating value, then presumably an opportunity does not exist. Similarly, 
Ucbasaran et al. (2008) investigate whether respondents had identified, and pursued, an 
opportunity – but not whether they had exploited it. Again, because opportunities can only 
be identified once exploited, Ucbasaran et al. must be referring to respondents’ beliefs that 
opportunities existed. A final example comes from Dahlqvist and Wiklund (2012). Defining 
opportunities as objective and discoverable, they operationalise them in terms of 
respondent assessments of the market newness of their perceived opportunity.  Defining 
opportunities as circumstances independent of the entrepreneur and then switching to 
definitions based on beliefs about them, conflate the two, with contradictory consequences 
for theorising entrepreneurial action.  
 
                                                          
7 This is not entirely the case. Baker et al. (2005), for example, use the language of discovery 
while referring to opportunities as inescapably subjective and enacted. Such complications 
add further urgency to re-examining the opportunity concept. 
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Some have responded to this conceptual ambiguity by distinguishing first- and third-person 
opportunities (McMullen and Shepherd 2006) and ‘opportunity for me’ accounts (Haynie et 
al. 2009). These adjustments do not, however, overcome the problems of conceptualising 
opportunity coherently.   McMullen and Shepherd (2006) define third-person opportunities 
in terms of a prospective entrepreneur’s belief that triggers a decision-making process 
(McMullen and Shepherd 2006) and to first-person opportunities in terms of an 
entrepreneur deciding “that a possible third-person opportunity is an opportunity for him or 
her” (McMullen and Shepherd 2006:138). Use of the term ‘possible’ indicates that outcomes 
are uncertain, so this can only refer to the entrepreneur’s belief that action will produce 
successful outcomes – not that the perceived opportunity will necessarily culminate in a 
profitable sale, which can only be known retrospectively. Haynie et al. (2009:339) focus on 
the process by which entrepreneurs evaluate a given opportunity, presupposing it exists 
prior to, and independent of, the entrepreneur’s evaluation – in which case its status as a 
profitable prospect is uncertain at the time of evaluation. Both studies therefore blur belief 
and outcome.  
 
Martin and Wilson (2014), and Ramoglou and Tsang (2015), using critical realist ideas, 
propose novel conceptions of opportunity as the circumstances that enable entrepreneurial 
change to happen (Martin and Wilson 2014) or as the propensity for market demand to be 
actualised into profits through the introduction of novel products and services (Ramoglou 
and Tsang 2015).8 Successful outcomes are therefore assumed. Entrepreneurs discover 
                                                          
8 Martin and Wilson’s (2014) approach might be termed the causal powers theory of 
opportunity development; Ramoglou and Tsang (2015) name theirs the actualisation 
approach. We discuss them here because, like discovery approaches, they define 
opportunity wholly or partly in terms of circumstances.  
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what is possible by actualising it through their activities. These approaches tackle the 
implicit actualism in discovery approaches, that opportunities are concretely present even if 
unobserved (Ramoglou and Tsang 2015). This kind of thinking is certainly more in keeping 
with our own approach, based on a deep ontology of causal powers, actions and events, and 
experience.  
 
In a subsequent paper, Wilson and Martin (2015) specify what they refer to as the boundary 
conditions of opportunity, structural and agential, that enable them to demarcate 
opportunity from the wider category of possibility, linking conditions of action to a 
particular goal-seeking entrepreneur; Ramoglou and Tsang (2015) also refer to the 
inevitable subjectivity of profit goals.9 Opportunity explicitly refers to circumstances, or 
potentials, that are activated by the entrepreneur.  But, in addition to adding yet another 
layer of meaning to a heavily-laden concept of opportunity, we believe this approach does 
not avoid the problem of conflation of structure and agency that afflicts Shane and others 
operationalising his primary view in empirical work. In any actual, concrete situation, 
agential beliefs and goals, and social context, are necessary ingredients of a social scientific 
explanation of entrepreneurial action, but merging them in an abstract conception of 
opportunity obscures rather than illuminates.  From a critical realist standpoint, conjoining 
circumstances and agential belief in an abstract definition of opportunity makes 
opportunities agent-dependent, that is, if the agent does not believe there is an 
opportunity, then one does not exist. Ultimately, this collapses the possibilities inherent in a 
                                                          
9 The subjectivity of profit goals radically relativises the concept of opportunity. Conceivably, 
an entrepreneur might operate an unprofitable business, possibly because s/he hopes to 
make a profit in future. Such loss-making might constitute a subjectively-acceptable level of 
performance, at least for a while: is this an opportunity?  
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particular context into agential beliefs about, or perceptions of, that context. To avoid 
conflation, opportunity must be conceptualised as a property of the context - a potential for 
an action or event to happen independent of anyone’s beliefs about, or intentions towards, 
it.  
 
But, then, to describe the circumstances within which action occurs as an opportunity in the 
absence of an intentional agent seems odd – as the term seems to require an agent who 
might find circumstances favourable to his/her aims. Gartner (2014:25, italics added) 
captures this idea when he states that possibilities become opportunities when they are 
perceived as both desirable and feasible, a position that necessarily requires a human 
perceiver. If we follow Wilson and Martin (2015), then, we can either have conflation of 
structure and agency, if we include reference to the entrepreneur in an abstract concept of 
opportunity, or we can utilise an agent-centred concept incorporating reference to 
intentions to describe a set of circumstances that exist independent of any particular 
agent’s beliefs and intentions!  
 
Turning to Ramoglou and Tsang (2015), it is unclear what is to be gained by referring to the 
conditions that pre-date profit actualisation as an opportunity once they have been 
actualised. Telling us after Microsoft has grown into a business empire that Bill Gates had an 
opportunity beforehand adds nothing to explaining how specific activities in particular 
circumstances produced that empire. The term opportunity seems empty, lacking specificity 
regarding what aspects of circumstances made which actions, and effects, possible. Any 
successful entrepreneurial action (however defined) might, of course, be redescribed, 
retrospectively, as discovering an opportunity. We are not convinced there is anything to be 
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gained by doing that, particularly in light of the contrasting uses of the concept. The less 
ambiguous term ‘conditions of action’ avoids this problem. It can be integrated into 
explanations of entrepreneurial action without assuming any particular outcome and can 
therefore be used in relation to current entrepreneurial actions prior to the production of 
their effects. Entrepreneurial projects that prove to be non-profitable are important too 
because, when acted upon, they influence market conditions which, in turn, affect all 
market agents. It also avoids the problem, acknowledged by the authors, of being unable to 
distinguish a non-opportunity from an unactualised (real, but unknown) opportunity.   
 
Summarising, Shane conflates two radically different conceptions of opportunity - as 
situations ripe for profit-making and as subjective beliefs. The concept of opportunity 
cannot refer sensibly to both. More recent critical realist-inspired work constitutes an 
advance on Shane by deepening the ontological framework for explaining entrepreneurial 
action but also either falls prey to the same problem of conflation, or adopts the vocabulary 
of opportunity to refer to circumstances retrospectively when it is not clear what is to be 
gained from doing so. A non-opportunity-based analytical framework might offer a superior, 
less confusing, means of explaining entrepreneurial action.  
 
OPPORTUNITY CREATION  
Schumpeter (1934) is regarded as the precursor of the creation approach, emphasising the 
role of entrepreneurs as initiators of change and creators of new resource combinations. 
Advocates of creation conceive of opportunities as subjectively imagined and enacted by 
entrepreneurs, through interaction with stakeholders, including investors and customers, 
rather than caused by changes in what they term exogenous factors such as technology 
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(Bhave 1994; Chiasson and Saunders 2005; Fletcher 2006; Sarason et al. 2006; Alvarez and 
Barney 2007; Dimov 2007; Endres and Woods 2007; Hjorth 2007; Wood and McKinley 2010; 
Popp and Holt 2013; Tocher et al. 2015).  In this view, opportunities possess no prior, 
independent existence separate from entrepreneur/stakeholder interaction (Gartner et al. 
2003; Dimov 2011). Opportunity creation is conceptualised as an unfolding, non-linear 
process during which venture ideas are intuited and refined, relationships with stakeholders 
formed and transformed, resources acquired and mobilised, and may refer to the process of 
‘groping’ towards a sale or to the sale itself (Dimov 2011).  For those defining opportunity in 
terms of sales, until the sale is achieved, the existence and precise nature of the opportunity 
is uncertain (Sarasvathy 2001; Ardichvili et al. 2003; Dimov 2011; Popp and Holt 2013).   
 
Opportunity creation studies are intended to provide a more relational account of 
entrepreneurial processes (Korsgaard 2013). For some, opportunities are created in a 
process of conceptualisation, objectification and enactment whereby opportunities are 
conceived in thought, objectified through interactions with peers and then enacted or 
abandoned (Wood and McKinley 2010; Tocher et al. 2015).  Others emphasise the role of 
language in the actualisation of opportunities in networks of interpersonal relations 
(Cornelissen and Clarke 2010; Spedale and Watson 2014). Yet others stress the emergent, 
collective process of opportunity creation arising from interaction between multiple agents 
with no single, originating entrepreneur (Maine et al. 2015; Overholm et al. 2015). 
 
Perhaps the fundamental turning point in the career of the opportunity concept came when 
advocates of opportunity creation appropriated the term while, at the same time, 
transforming its meaning to refer to agents’ activities or beliefs, rather than to the context 
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of action as discovery thinkers ostensibly use it. Although the emphasis of creation on 
agency and the relational aspects of entrepreneurial action is warranted, like others, we are 
not convinced that appending the label opportunity to activities adequately conceptualised 
in other terms offers any new theoretical insight (Ramoglou and Zyglidopolous 2015). In 
creation accounts, the term opportunity simply redescribes activities such as having a 
business idea, acquiring, combining and mobilising resources, networking with stakeholders, 
creating new ventures and achieving a product sale - but contributes nothing to enhance 
understanding. There is no need to proliferate terms unnecessarily when well-established 
concepts already exist. Opportunity creation analysts might instead have reverted to 
existing terms to refer to their social objects of interest.  This has been a major source of the 
confusion evident in discussions of opportunity. 
 
To repeat our criticism of the discovery approach, business ideas, and practices such as 
resource acquisition, combination and mobilisation, setting up a new venture and making a 
sale are, ontologically speaking, distinct social objects and should be conceptualised as such. 
There is a difference between imagining a future, engaging in specific practices to achieve it 
and accomplishing it. Wood and McKinley (2010), for instance, go some way to 
acknowledging the distinction between ideas and enacted practices, yet retain the term 
opportunity to refer to both a business idea and the sale.  
 
These problems mirror wider difficulties with constructionist approaches that often obscure 
whether researchers’ concepts refer to entrepreneurs’ cognitive, linguistic or discursive 
articulations (what entrepreneurs think or say) or to their enacted, embodied practices 
(what entrepreneurs do) (Sayer 2000). The deep ontology of powers, and actions and events 
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seeks to avoid collapsing practices into experience. The entrepreneur’s belief that an 
opportunity exists is ontologically distinct from the practice of groping towards, or 
achieving, a product sale, even though the belief causally influences such practices and their 
consequences.  
 
Opportunity creation researchers often assume a range of non-experiential social objects in 
their analyses such as competitive market or industry imperfections (Alvarez and Barney 
2007) or social structures (Wood and McKinley 2010; Tocher et al. 2015). Such social objects 
are typically presented as either conditions or consequences of action. Alvarez et al. (2013) 
refer to objective reality - which is odd for a constructionist approach. One can only 
presume these authors wish to treat objective reality as exerting real causal effects on 
entrepreneurs.  Such forms of constructionism, however, are potentially consistent with a 
stratified critical realist social ontology that conceptualises social reality as comprising more 
than that which entrepreneurs and their stakeholders describe it to be.  Proponents of 
opportunity creation have overstated the differences between constructionism and critical 
realism in order to argue that the latter necessarily underpins discovery accounts (Alvarez 
and Barney 2010) –moderate forms of constructionism, accepting the crucial causal role of 
agents and culture in the production of social objects, are necessary for critical realist 
explanation. For critical realists it is easy to accommodate perceptions and beliefs and other 
social objects (perhaps competitive market imperfections and social structures) within a 
unified ontological framework. There are always structural and cultural conditions of 
possibility for any social activity or belief; these conditions are irreducible to perceptions (or 
conceptual, linguistic or discursive constructions) of them (Bhaskar 1979; Sayer 1992).  
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THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF SYNTHESIS  
Attempts to synthesise different conceptions of opportunity, or to treat discovery and 
creation as different types of opportunity, reveal a failure to engage in ontological 
theorising. Given the very different ontological commitments underpinning the main 
discovery and creation definitions of opportunity, synthesising the two in an abstract 
concept specifying the necessary properties and powers of opportunity is impossible.  An 
abstract concept of opportunity cannot sensibly refer to an agential belief or imagined 
future and to an action or event and to circumstances. Beliefs, actions and circumstances 
are distinct kinds of object and need to be distinguished conceptually in order that their 
causal connections can be identified in studies of actual, concrete cases. Indeed, some use 
the term opportunity belief to distinguish subjective states from activities and the social 
context (Shepherd et al. 2007; Wood et al. 2014). Reviews that encompass discovery- and 
creation-based studies compound the confusion when they suggest the possibility of 
synthesis without acknowledging the ontological difficulties (e.g. Short et al. 2010; Mainela 
et al. 2014).  
 
Some distinguish discovery and creation as distinct types of opportunity (Zahra 2008; 
Alvarez and Barney 2010; Baron and Henry 2010; Overholm 2015; Valliere 2015).  Treating 
beliefs, actions and circumstances as variants of a single entity – opportunity – reflects a 
chaotic conception (Sayer 1992). For instance, de Jong and Marsili (2015) attempt to 
combine what they term ‘Kirznerian’ and ‘Schumpeterian’ opportunities, intended to reflect 
discovery and creation thinking respectively, into a single continuum of opportunity types. 
This attempt at synthesis treats opportunities as though the difference between discovery 
and creation is one of degree and overlooks entirely their very different ontological 
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assumptions. Attempts to distinguish discovery and creation as distinct types of opportunity 
are, we suggest, doomed because a coherent concept cannot refer both to an object that 
exists prior to entrepreneurial action (discovery), and to one that only comes into being 
through, or as a consequence of, action (creation).   
 
TOWARDS A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURIAL ACTION 
Readers may wonder what researchers would study if the concept of opportunity was 
abandoned.  This would be an unfortunate legacy, demonstrating the power of a conceptual 
image to bewitch an audience. We share Gartner (2003) and Davidsson’s (2015) diagnosis of 
the problems with the opportunity concept  but go beyond them to provide both an 
ontologically-based critique of conceptions of opportunity and to offer an ontologically-
grounded framework to support explanation of the causes, processes and outcomes of 
entrepreneurial action, without a concept of opportunity. Our approach shares much in 
common with other critical realist-inspired work with its emphasis on the possibilities for 
action afforded by the causal powers, or propensities, inherent in a particular social context 
(Martin and Wilson 2014; Wilson and Martin 2015; Ramoglou and Tsang 2015). We do not, 
however, try to resurrect an opportunity approach that might elicit the unwanted 
reabsorption of particular assumptions into analysis and explanation. 
 
We propose a new framework centring on entrepreneurial action and the structural and 
cultural conditions that enable, motivate and constrain it. We use the less ambiguous 
concepts of ‘entrepreneurial project’ to refer to investments in resources intended to create 
goods and services for market exchange, ‘conditions of action’ to refer to the context within 
which such projects are acted upon, and a bundle of well-known terms such as imagining 
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and developing a business idea, resource acquisition, combination and mobilisation, 
networking, new venture creation and making a sale to refer to particular actions. Our 
formulation of conditions of action avoids the conceptual confusion that comes with 
multiple meanings of opportunity (as belief, action or circumstances) and imposes no 
assumption that entrepreneurs know how conditions enable their activities or that 
successful consequences follow from entrepreneurial actions.  
 
Entrepreneurs consciously formulate projects to achieve their goals and deliberate over 
what actions to take to attain them. Projects may combine ‘business’ and ‘personal’ goals, 
though agents may not make such distinctions themselves. Conceptualised in this way, 
projects are long- and medium-term goals to which agents commit themselves, rather than 
simply decisions to engage in specific practices (Archer 2000).  The content of projects is 
likely to be highly variable between entrepreneurs and over time. Use of the term project 
implies no particular type of aim or organisational context.  It might be difficult to pinpoint 
precisely when a project starts and ends because of the blurred boundary between thought 
and action.  We argue that a project exists when an agent consciously adopts a goal 
following reflexive deliberation over ends and dedicates themselves to achieving it. 
Investments of skill, effort and material resources manifest the project in embodied 
practices, for instance, buying raw materials and other inputs, hiring or redeploying labour, 
securing finance or setting up a limited company. Entrepreneurs may, of course, revise or 
abandon projects as a consequence of action.   
 
Entrepreneurs pursue projects largely under conditions not of their own making, uncertain 
whether their actions will succeed. They act in, and on, a natural world of non-human 
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resources, a practical world of human-made artefacts and a socio-cultural world of relations 
with other people, to create new goods and services for market exchange in the belief that 
this will enable them to realise some goal.  This allows for diversity in goals (levels of 
economic return deemed subjectively acceptable), business practices and interactions with 
stakeholders, and outcomes. It is these activities, the structural and cultural conditions that 
make them possible, and their consequences, that researchers should theorise anew. For 
this, they need no concept of opportunity.  
 
Adopting a morphogenetic framework of socio-historical change facilitates more powerful 
theorising (Archer 1995; Mole and Mole 2010), connecting structural, cultural and agential 
causal powers in an interactive, emergent process. Structure, culture and agency are 
necessary conditions of all entrepreneurial action and therefore all are necessary 
ingredients in an adequate explanation of its causes, processes and consequences. Such a 
framework helps to rebalance explanations that treat entrepreneurial action in individualist 
and voluntarist terms as if untethered to any social context. Entrepreneurs never construct 
something out of nothing (contrast Baker and Nelson 2005 and Chiles et al. 2007); there are 
always enabling conditions.  
 
History bequeaths to contemporary agents the structural and cultural settings in which they 
must necessarily act, although agents must reflect on their circumstances in order to 
formulate, and seek to realise, particular projects (Archer 2000, 2003).  The necessity for 
agents to interpret their circumstances in order to pursue projects does not deny the pre-
existence, autonomy and causal efficacy of social structures (Bhaskar 1979) and cultures 
(Archer 1988; Porpora 2015). Circumstances are not simply conceptual, linguistic or 
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discursive constructions but, rather, as Martin and Wilson (2014) and Ramoglou and Tsang 
(2015) suggest, real objective conditions with particular causal powers that entrepreneurs 
might activate, intentionally or unwittingly, through their activities.10 Both the dominant 
discovery and, particularly, the creation approaches lack an explicit deep social ontology, 
intended to capture the multiple causal powers generating actions/event. They thereby 
encourage individualist and voluntarist explanations that accord entrepreneurs excessive 
powers of agency. 
 
Conceptualising context in terms of structure and culture directs attention to the 
relationships, resource distributions, institutions and cultural norms that pre-date and 
causally affect the actions of contemporary entrepreneurs. Possibilities for entrepreneurial 
action vary with many of the contextual features identified in prior research – including 
technology, and political/regulatory and social/demographic contexts (Shane 2003) – that 
vary over time. But possibilities also vary for particular entrepreneurs due to their particular 
positioning in relation to multiple structural and cultural contexts, as this has developed 
over their personal, family and business life courses (Jayawarna et al. 2013).  Entrepreneurs 
are always already positioned in relation to particular structures and cultures that enable 
unequal command of, and motivation to use, financial resources, knowledge and skills, and 
social connections in particular ways (Thornton et al. 1999; Rouse and Jayawarna 2011; 
Eddleston and Powell 2012; Perry-Rivers 2016). Positions relate to how structures such as 
gender, class, and ethnicity have affected, and continue to shape, the life courses of 
entrepreneurs.  Contrast the constrained resources and capacity to trade in lucrative 
                                                          
10 Roscoe et al.’s (2013) study of an agricultural enterprise in Honduras makes the important 
observation that successful entrepreneurial action is often dependent upon favourable 
natural contexts too.  
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markets of migrant female entrepreneurs using scarce time to provide low value-added 
services to deprived localities (Rouse and Mirza, 2014) with affluent male entrepreneurs 
providing higher value services. 
 
Circumstances privilege some entrepreneurs while, at the same time, frustrating the efforts 
of others to further their projects (Rouse and Kitching, 2006), primarily due to the actions of 
structurally- and culturally-positioned others pursuing their own goals (Archer 1995). In 
some circumstances, entrepreneurs might be better described as lucky (Görling and Rehn 
2008) than exercising good judgment (Foss and Klein 2012).  The good fortune particular 
circumstances bestow on particular entrepreneurs further encourages analysis of structural 
influences such as class (Jayawarna et al. 2014), gender (Hughes et al. 2012; Rouse et al. 
2013) or ethnicity (Carter et al. 2015) and discourages disproportionate attention to 
information-search and -processing capabilities (Baron 2006; Sleptsov and Anand 2008).  
 
To argue that actions are possible means only that a particular agent could act in a 
particular way given prevailing structural and cultural conditions, although this might only 
be discoverable later. Because only one future is ever actualised, we can never be certain 
what other possibilities were inherent in a given set of historical circumstances. Favourable 
conditions, however, never suffice to ensure an event occurs, given the agent’s powers to 
act otherwise (Ramoglou 2013). Agents must choose how to deploy their limited resources 
at particular moments in history; they cannot pursue all projects open to them 
simultaneously. 
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The structured, emergent, processual and open-ended character of social life means that 
possibilities for action are heavily time-, space- and position-dependent. Circumstances 
undergo a continuous process of gentle or rapid change, partly as a consequence of what 
entrepreneurs do but mainly as a consequence of the actions of the multitude of others, 
shaping possibilities for action for particular agents in particular times and places. 
Entrepreneurs cannot wish the context away; they must deal with the world as it confronts 
them in all of its dynamic complexity. 
 
The framework we propose formalises and systematises what we believe many 
entrepreneurship and small business researchers already do to some degree; Fleetwood and 
Ackroyd (2004) make a similar argument in relation to management and organisation 
studies. Where researchers refer to unobservable social structures such as class, gender, 
ethnicity, organisations or markets, or to cultural objects such as social norms, or 
discourses, to explain some aspect of entrepreneurial action, they adopt, implicitly, a 
layered social ontology that distinguishes the causal powers of structures and cultures, from 
actual practices and experiences.  Adopting a critical realist position explicitly can support a 
more systematic approach to thinking through the implications of a stratified social 
ontology for research practice and analysis (Edwards et al. 2014). 
 
The vocabulary of entrepreneurial projects and conditions of action provides a more useful 
set of concepts for explaining the causes, processes and consequences of entrepreneurial 
action than opportunity. The concept of conditions of action is similar to Davidsson’s (2015) 
‘external enablers’ but the latter are not conceptualised in terms of a deep ontology of 
powers, actions/events, and experience. This risks slipping back into the actualism 
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debilitating discovery views that treats opportunities as circumstances that are present but 
unobserved rather than as circumstances that need to be acted in, and on, by entrepreneurs 
in order to actualise, and discover, the causal powers that exist within a particular situation. 
 
We propose that the contradictory concept of opportunity be dispensed with because it 
hinders theoretical development regarding how new goods and services come into being 
through interactions between entrepreneurs and their structural and cultural contexts. 
Studies unnecessarily and unhelpfully framed around the opportunity concept impede 
explanation. Given the time and effort researchers have invested in the concept, however, it 
is unlikely the term will be discarded lightly, even if persuaded of our arguments. 
Anticipating some reluctance, we request that researchers at least take the important 
precaution of distinguishing entrepreneurial project, business or venture idea, or 
opportunity belief, from actual practices, such as creating new organisations, and from the 
wider contexts within which they act.   
 
CONCLUSION 
We have reviewed and critiqued the dominant discovery and creation conceptions of 
entrepreneurial opportunity from the standpoint of critical realist social ontology. This has 
enabled us to identify contradictions and inconsistencies in definition and differences in 
ontological presuppositions that seriously hinder progress in theorising the causes, 
processes and consequences of entrepreneurial action, defined in terms of investments in 
resources intended to create new goods and services for market exchange. Critical realism, 
with its explicit attention to ontology and its emphasis on clear conceptualisation, provides 
powerful resources for such an analysis. Discovery and creation are presented as opposing 
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approaches but proponents of both commit a similar error in switching between 
conceptions of opportunities as radically different kinds of social object - as social situations 
possessing profit-making prospects, as particular practices, and as agential beliefs or 
imagined futures. Using the same term to refer to all three types of object has produced 
conceptual chaos and theoretical stagnation.  
 
Striking a more positive note for future research, critical realism provides valuable 
conceptual resources for explaining how entrepreneurial action emerges from the 
continuous interaction between human agents and their conditions of action. Future 
conceptual work and empirical research might explore the definition and interdependencies 
of entrepreneurial projects and examine how contexts shape their formulation and 
execution. As entrepreneurs are variably-positioned to exploit circumstances, it would be 
surprising if conditions did not profoundly shape their projects.   
 
Rather than simply looking at entrepreneurs’ cognitive characteristics and information-
processing capabilities, critical realism directs us to investigate the structural and cultural 
contexts of action and how these enable, motivate and constrain entrepreneurial projects 
and the creation of new goods and services. While calls for greater attention to context are 
frequently made, few adopt an explicit critical realist stance seeking to explain how 
structural and cultural positioning influences entrepreneurial action, although elements of 
this kind of explanation are present in a number of studies. Authoritative explanation 
depends on adoption of a deep social ontology of causal powers, actions and events, and 
experience.  
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Entrepreneurs must act to realise their projects, but they cannot bend the social world, 
voluntaristically, to their wishes. Entrepreneurs act in, and on, a socially-structured and 
culturally-shaped world which may resist their efforts to transform it into new products, 
firms and markets. Entrepreneurs’ projects and performance are necessarily shaped by the 
actions of structurally- and culturally-positioned others, close and distant, including many of 
whom the entrepreneur is, and will forever remain, unaware. Discarding the opportunity 
concept should not lead to abandonment of attention to the influence of the environment 
but rather to renewed concern with explaining how context, conceptualised in structural 
and cultural terms, enables, motivates and constrains particular entrepreneurs to engage in 
particular forms of entrepreneurial action in particular times and places.  
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